Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1939

State of Utah v. Richard Jessup : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Claude T. Barnes; attorney for defendant and appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Jessup, No. 6193 (Utah Supreme Court, 1939).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/537

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

(

)

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF l.TAH

THE STATE OF rT~-\.H.
Plaintiff aud Rt'c'poudt:>nt.
CASE
Ko. t11!l;)
RICHARD JESSrP,
Defendant and .Appellant.

APPEAL FRO:M THE FIFTH DISTRICT COL"RT
OF L"TAH, \\ASHIXGTOX, COrXTY
HOX. \\ILL L. HOYT, .JrDGE

Brief of Defendant and Appellant

CLArDE T. BARXES
Attorney for Dejenda1d
and Appellant
-

-

.. ,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX OF CASES
Calef v. Calef, 54 Me. 365, 9~ Am. D. 549 .... .. ...
Comm. v. Calef, 10 Mass. 153 ............ .. ........ .............
Corpus Juris, 59 pag-e 'i97 ....... . .
Corpus Juris, 59, page 81~ ..................... ..
Corpus Juris Secundum, 14, page 1311 .............
De Berry v. De Berry, 115 ,V. Va., 604, 177 S. ~~-

1;;

13
ti

7
4

440 ---------------------------------···········································

4

In re Boyington, 157 Ia. 467, 137 N. 'V. 949 .. ..............
In re Miller's Est., 72 P. 2d 819 (Okla.) -----···················
In re Mills, 137 Cal. 298, 70 P. 91 ---------------------------·-------Jackson v. State, 116 Ind. -!65, 19 N. E. 330 -------·-------Johnson v. Comm., 152 Va. 965, 1-!6 S. E. 289 __________

5
13
8
13
5

King v. U. S., 17 Fed. 61 ------------------------------------·---------------Martin v. State, 89 Ind. App. 107, 165 N. E. 763____
State v. Connoway, Tapp. 58 (Ohio) ---------------------------State v. Graham, 23 Utah 278 ----------------------------------·----State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572 ----------------------------- . ________
State v. Lawrence, 19 Neb. 307, 27 N. W. 126 ____________
State v. Tieman, 32 Wash. 294, 73 P. 375 ____________________
State v. Tuttle, 129 Me. 125, 150 A. 490 ---------------·- ______
Turney v. State, 60 Ark 259, 29 S. W. 893 ____________________

4
5
5
12
12
4
8
5
13

United States v. Cannon, 4 Utah 131 ---------------------------- 11
Utah State Fair v. Green, 68 Utah 251 --------------··-------- 6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,..

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Pl(l.in.tiff aud Respondent,

CASE
No. 6193

vs.
RICHARD JESSUP,
Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Defendant and Appellant
STATEMENT
In this action the respondent, a resident of New
Harmony, Washington County, Utah, was tried hefore a jury and convicted of cohabiting with more than
one person of the opposite sex. The evidence showed·
that defendant lived on a ranch, fifty yards or so froni
his brother's residence; that his wife Ida Johnson ,J essup is a cousin of Lola Johnson and also of Mary Carling. On September 2, 1939, the day of the arrest, Mary
Carling was visiting her cousin Lydia at the Fred
Jessup home ; and she stated that Lola Johnson was
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visiting at the defendant's home, being a cousin of Mrs.
Richard Jessup; and that Lola, who was pregnant, had
be,en there for the two weeks that she, Mary Carling,
had been there.
When the Sheriff and his deputy arrested the defendant they saw Mrs. Jessup at the home, also Lola
Johnson; and on the way to St. George the defendant
told them that they were being persecuted for the same
things their fathers had done, and that they believed in
living according to the laws of God.
No further testimony was offered; both sides rested;
the defendant moved for a directed verdict, and, upon
its denial, the case was submitted to the jury.
ARGUMENT
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERRORS NOS. 1, 4, 5 AND 10
'The Court erred in overruling defendant's motion to
quash the information for the reason:
A. The information fails to state or charge a public offense.

B. Section 103-51-2, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, as amended by Chapter 112, Laws of Utah, 1935,
is:
1.

Unconstitutional for the reason:
a. It violates the Utah Constitution
(Art. 6, Sec. 23) providing that "no bill
shall be passed containing more than one subject.''
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b. Tbe title of the Act dol's not
all its subjects.

l'·OnH·

c. It combines a criminal with n ci \'i 1
statute.
It is incon8istent with 105-:!1-:m and
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1~l:~:J, as
amended by Chap. 118, Laws of Utah, 1~l:35,
both of which were passed on the same date
and bec.ame effectiYe on the same date as
the statute in question.
d.

105-~1-40

e. It nolates Article 1, Sec. 12 of the
rtah Constitution, which proYides that "a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband."
f. It nolates Article 1, Sec. 12 of the
"Ltah Constitution, which proYides that ''the
aceused shall not be compelled to give eVIoonce against himself."
2. The said section fails to set forth, describe or define a crime.
C. The information fails to comply with Sec. 10521-8, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1933, as amended by
Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935.

A.
The information (Abs. 2) charged: "That the said
Richard Jessup on or about the first day of September,
1939, at Washington County, State of Utah, did cohabit
with more than one person of the opposite sex". (Italics
mine). The ancient Greeks expected their legislators
ooemolia bazein-to talk words of wind-but their final
enactments to make sense. To cohabit with more than
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one person of the opposite sex. (L. cohabitare-to dwell)
could mean to dwell with one's brothers, sisters, or even
one's children; for there is no crime of cohabitation at
common law, and even the statutes apply descriptive
terms to it to make it so. "It is purely statutory, and it
is a new offense in our statutes." (U. S. vs. Cannon, 4
Utah 130). As the statute reads a woman may be guilty
by dwelling with her brothers, sons or other relatives;
a man, by dwelling with his sisters, daughters, or other
relatives; a little boy, by dwelling with his sisters; a
little girl, by dwelling with her brothers. It even suggests polyandry, a practice known to the Tibetans and
the N airs, but exotic here. As the statute stands, therefore, it is nonsense, as the word ''cohabit'' alone is of
innocent connotation. As has been well said:
''in order to give it proper effect in any case regard must be had to the subject matter to which
it relates, to the situation and conditions in respect to which it is used, and to the explanatory
and qualifying language accompanying it.''
14 c. J. s. 1311.
King v. U. S., 17 F. 2d 61.
De Berry v. De Berry, 177 S. E. 440, 115
W.Va. 604.
State v. Lawrence, 27 N. W. 126, 19 Neb. 307.
There is no qualifying or explanatory language in the
statute, though other states, in giving criminal import
to the word apparently deem adjectives essential; thus:
"cohabit as man and wife" (Le Blanc v. Yawn, 126
So. 789, 99 Fla. 328); "cohabit with any other woman"
(State v. Connaway, Tapp. 58-0hio) : ''lewdly and lasSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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civiously associate and cohabit together" (Johnson v.
Com., 146 S. E. 28~), 152 Yn. 9t15 ), or lewdly and lasciviously cohabit' {State Y. Tutti~. 150 A. 4~)0, 12~) Me.125),
or "open and notorious illicit cohabitation" {King v.
U. S., 17 F. 2d 545), '"cohabiting as husband and wife"
(In re Boyington, 137 K. w·. ~)±~), 157 Iowa 4u7) and
"cohabiting in a state of adultery" (Martin v. State, 165
N. E. 763, 89 Ind. App. 107). A statutory absurdity is
ipso facto a nullity; and this one is nonz.i·ni.s umbra--the
mere shadow of the name of a crime. vV e can see no
basis for holding that the legislature in this instance
set forth, described or defined a crime.
B1a
Section 103-51-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933,
as amended by Chap. 112, Laws of Utah, 1935, under
which the information was drawn, is unconstitutional
for the reason that it violates the Utah Constitution
(Art. 6, Sec. 23) providing that "no bill shall be passed
containing more than one subject." The statute in reality
contains four subjects: 1. Cohabitation; 2. compelling
any person to testify; 3. using evidence in civil or criminal proceedings; and, 4. liability to prosecution for giving testimony. ·The statute r::ads as follows:
"103-51-2 - Unlawful Cohabitation.
All
Persons Except Defendant Must Testify. If any
person cohabits with more than one person of
the opposite sex, such person is guilty of a felony.
Any person, except the defendant, may be
compelled to testify in a prosecution for unlawSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ful cohabitation; provided, howev·er, that the evidence given in such prosecution shall not be
used against him in any proceeding, civil or
criminal, ·except for perjury in giving such testimony. A person so testifying shall not thereafter be liable to indictment, prosecution, or
punishment for the offense concerning which
such testimony was given.''
The rule against two subjects in enactments is mandatory in "nearly all jurisdictions" (59 Corpus Juris
797), and such statutes are "void" (59 C. J. 799). In
fact as stated in Utah State Fair v. Green, 68 Utah 251,
concerning such a statute, ''every provision thereof is
unconstitutional and void", and it should ~be determined
by the court without ''reference to economic or moral effect.''
The Statute amends Sec. 103-51-2, Compiled Laws
of Utah, 1933, on Unlawful Cohabitation, which appears
under Chapter 51 of the Penal Code entitled "Sexual
Offenses.'' There was nothing in Sec. 103-51-2 about
compelling witnesses to testify-that was added by the
1935 amendments, and was really an amendment of Sec.
105-45-6 of Chapter 45, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1933, on
"Witnesses and Evidence", particularly concerning the
testimony of a witness not to be used against him. The
sections should have been amended sepavately, and thus
a crime would not have been intermingled with testimony,
and immunities, civil and criminal, and prosecution aids.
Again it was a case of the legislature's covering too
much territory.
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Blb
The title of the Act under which the infonuntion was
drawn does not express all of the subjects, as required
by Art. 6, Sec. 23 of the Constitution of Utah. rrhe
title (Chap. 112, Laws of Utah, 1935, rends:

"An Act Amending Section 10:~-51-~, Rensed Statutes of rtnh, 1933, Making Unlawful
Cohabitation a Felony, and Providing that all
persons Except the Defendant Must Testify in
Proceedings Therefor.''
In the title there are two subjects: (a) unlawful cohabitation, and (b) all persons must testify; whereas in
the act there are four subjects: (a) unlawful cohabitation; (b) all persons must testify; (c) evidence may not
be used against witness; (d) non-liability to prosecution
for offense on which testimony given.

It is said:
"All parts of an act which are not within
its title are unconstitutional and void.''
59 c. J. 812.
Utah Fair v. Green, 68 Utah 251.

The word ''civil'' in the second paragraph of the
act enlarges the scope of the act greatly, taking it from
the criminal to the civil fisld, yet no mention of any
civil procedure effect is mentioned in the title or, for
that matter, even indicated..
B 1c

The preceding paragraph points out another defect
in the act; it combines a criminal with a ·civil statute. As
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stated in State v. Tieman, 32 Wash. 294, 73 P. 375, 98
Am. St. Rep. 854, a statute entitled one relative to
crimes and punishments and criminal proceedings cannot lawfully contain any provisions of a civil nature.
B1d

The Act is inconsistent with Sec. 105-21-39 and 10521-40, Revised Laws of Utah, 1933, as amended by Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935, both of which were passed
on the same date .and became effective on the same date
as the statute in question. Thus the cohabitation act was
passed on March 14, 1935, and was made effective on
:May 14, 1935; the inconsistent acts were passed on
March 14, 1935, and made effective on May 14, 1935. The
cohabitation act exempts ''any person'' from prosecution for testifying against the defendant even though he
be particeps crimin·is whereas the other two sections
(105-21-39 and 105-21-40 as amended by Chapter 118,
Laws of Utah, 1935) provide :
''Every person concerned in the .commission
of an offense, whether he directly commits the
offense, or procures, counsels, aids or ahets in its
commission even though not present, shall be
informed ·against or indicted and tried and punished as a principal.''
''An accessory may be prosecuted, tried and
punished, though the principal may fbe neither
prosecuted nor tried, and though the prin.cipal
may have been acquitted."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
B 1e

The Act also violates Article 1, Sec. 12, of the Utnh
Constitution which provides that ''a wife shnll not be
compelled to testify agaim~t her husband." It will be
noted that the Act reads : '' ~\ny person, except t hP defendant, may be compelled to testify in a prosecution
for unlawful cohabitation", and, of course, "any person" includes the defendant's wife. It is so apparent
that the Act is unconstitutional in this respect that it
is unnec-essary to argue it, even for emphasis. lt is
obviously, positively and unequivocally unconstitutional.
B1d

In similar fashion the Act disregards the Utah
Constitutional provision (Art. 1, Sec. 12) and the fifth
amendment of the Constitution of the United States providing that "the accused shall not :be compelled to give
evidence against himself.'' Unlawful cohabitation involves dwelling with more than one woman, hence in
a properly drawn information using names (herein later discussed) it is inevitable that there be an "accused"
other than the defendant. The very nature of the crime
includes a particeps criminis, an accomplice. The statute compells that other one to testify against herself,
thus violating the constitutional provision. N emo tenetur seipsum accusare is a highly respectoo maxim of
the common law, not lightly to be disregarded; and,
while immunity from prosecution might be granted in
State courts it in no way affects Federal prosecution nor
mitigates the public disgrace of self-incrimination.
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c.
The information fails to comply with Sec. 105-21-8,
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1933, as .amended by Chap. 118,
Laws of Utah, 1935. The section provides that an information may charge:
'' (a) By using the name given to the offens.e
by the common law or by statute.
(b) By stating so much of the definition of
the offense, either in terms of the common law
or of the statute defining the offense' or in terms
of substantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give the Court and the defendant notice
of what offense is intended to be charged."
I hope it is not contended by anyone that the reformation of criminal procedure as set forth in Chap. 118,
Laws of Utah, 1935, authorizes such abstract charging
of public offenses as: ''John Doe committed murder'';
"John Doe committed robbery", and so on throughout
the category of crimes-by merely naming them. Such
chargings are meaningless ; they disregard a corpus delicti, and are just as inane as hanging a man because he
says he committed murder when no one has been killed.
Nevertheless that is what the information does in this
case-it points to nothingness.
''1Did cohabit with more than one person of
the opposite sex.''
Those are the words. What persons? How did he
"eohabit "-as brother with sister, or as man .and wife?
Even in the ''Forms for Certain Offenses'' (Sec.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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103-21-47 a.s amended by Chap. 118, Laws of Utnh,
1935 ), pei~nitting the charging: of certain crime~ by IUUJling them, there is always au object; tlms, "A. B. a~
sault~:l C. D.", .......\. B. committt'd bigamy with C. D.",
"A. B. murdered C. D.", and so on. It would han' bePn
thought ridiculous to say merely •• A. B. assaultL•d ", "A.
B. committed bigamy", .. A. B. murdered", etc. 'fhe
statute did not ineludt> "unlawful cohabitation" in the
category of short forms; even if it had, it would likely
have set forth: "A. B. cohabited with C. D. and E. 14'.
as man and wife.'' The information, therefore, is an abstraction, a nullity. That such a defect is regarded as
fatal is set forth in L"nited States v. Cannon, 4 Utah 131
as follows:
''If the indictment had charged the defendant
with 'cohabiting with more than one woman',
without grnng the names of the womt•n
without time and place, it would have been insufficient in not giving particulars, so as to enable
defendant to make proper defense, or to plead the
judgment hereafter."
Also at page 130 it is said:
''To the general rule of describing statutory
offenses in the language of the statute there are
exceptions, the principal ones being (1) when the
statute makes that an offense which was an offense at common law, and (2) when the offense
is described in the statute in terms too general.''

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 2, ;)
The Court erred in overruling defendant's motion
for a directed verdict, for the reason that the evidence
is insufficient to justify or sustain the verdict. The eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dence merely amounts to this: At the defendant's home
his wife was being visited by her cousin who was pregnant, and the ·Cousin had been there for two weeks.
(Trans. p. 8 et seq.) Is there anything criminal about
that~ The scholarly exegesis of corpus delicti in State v.
Johnson, 95 Utah 572, has application here, except that
in the instant case we have no confession to deal with.
Nearly every home-owner in the country, from the President down, has at some time or other a female relative
visiting the home, probably enceinte as often as otherWise.
The jury perhaps cogitated on the basis of a presumption of guilt or on the theory that the defendant
would not have been arrested unless guilty. They were
not out long enough to read the instructions, for they
were back with their verdict while the Court still sat on
the bench merely discussing the next day's calendar, a
matter of five minutes. Conviction by rumor an:d local
atmosphere was denounced in the last of the early cohabitation cases to reach the existing Utah reports. Thus
in State v. Graham, 23 Utah 278 (290) the Court said:
''the defendant could only be convicted upon
proof of affirmativ·e acts upon his part from
which the jury might infer guilt. But it would be
setting a dangerous precedent to permit the mere
belief or thought of acquaintances and neighbors
and friends to become an element in any crime."
The Court in another place (p. 288) very aptly made
an observation that is most pertinent here:
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"This is so upon the \n•U-estnbli~IH'd rult'
that the law presumes a usual nnd ordinary ~tntP
of thino·s ratht•r than a peculiar nnd t'Xl'Pptiounl
conditi~n·; it supposes legality rntlwr thnn erintl';
and virtue and nwrality ratlwr thnn thl• opposite
qualities. ''
. .\.pplying
.
that rule to the instant e<1se \H' find that
the law presumes that the defendant's wifl' 's cou~iu
was nsiting the home lawfully, in the usual manner, for
the usual purpose; and there is nothing in the e,·idence
to the contrary.
Another thing: this cnme of cohabitation-if indeed it really exists at all; for adultery au<l bigamy
apparently take c.are of e\ery unlawful situation-is a
continuing thing not to be pro\ed by a single visit of
the sheriff, or a single obseiTation of anyone else.
The term cohabit ''imports a dwelling together for some period of time and does not include
mere nsits or journeys.''
14 c. J. s. 1311.
In re :Millers Estate, 78 P. 2d 819 (Okla.)
Turney v. State, 29 S. \V. 893, 60 Ark. 259.
Jackson v. State, 19 K. E. 330, 116 Ind. 465.
Calef v. Calef, 54 11e. 365, 92 Am. Dec. 549.
State v. Connoway, Tapp, 58 (Ohio).
The term "cohabiting" carries with it the
idea of a fixed residenc2 rather than that of a
transient or single unlawful interview.''
14 c. J. s. 1311.
In re Mills, 70 P. 91, 137 Cal. 298, 92 Am.
St. Rep. 175.
Comm. v. Calef, 10 Mass. 153.
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''It has been said that cohabitation is not a
sojourn, nor a habit of visiting nor even remaining with for a time, but that the term implies cmttinuity."
14 C. J. S. 1312.
In re W ray's Est. 19 P. 2d 1051 ; 93 Mont.
525.
All that the sheriff saw was that a lady besides the
the wife of defendant was at the house the day of his
visit (Trans. p. 19); and the State's first witness testified (Trans. p. 8) the lady was the defendant's wife's
cousin. To argue that such evidence-and that is all
there was to it-proved .a crime must presume upon the
time of the Court, and should not be pursued further.
ASSIGNMENT NO. 6
When counsel for the State asked a witness if she
was acquainted with "Lola Johnson, sometimes called
Lola Jessup'' he involved, in his question evidence that
did not exist. (Trans. p. 11) No one had testified that
Lola Johnson was known also as Lola Jessup; and, of
course, this error greatly harmed the defendant in his
rights.
ASSIGNMENTS NOS. 7 AND 9
Likewise, when the Court permitted questions concerning the whereabouts of per~ons twenty days after
the arrest (Trans. p. 16) it illegally prejudiced the defendant in the minds of the jury. In United States v.
Cannon, 4 Utah 152, the Court said:
"They must confine their investigation of his
guilt or innocence to the proof of facts and cirSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cumstnnces occurring between the dntes." (Alleged in the indictment).
In criminal c~1ses the rule of exclusion is even
more important than in ci,·il eases (Lightfoot v. People,
16 Mic.h. 501, 511).
A.SSIGXMEXT XO. 8
The Court erred. in admitting testimony conct.~rn
ing the pregnant condition of Lola Johnson (Trans. p.
17) because her eondition was entirely immaterial.
(L"nited States '· Cannon, 4 rtah 122.
For the many reasons herein stated, we can see
no escape from the conclusion that the judgment should
be re\ersed.
Respectfully submitted,

CLAlJDE T. BARNES,
Attorney for Defendant
and Appella!nt.
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